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LIABILITY FOR ALL, PRIVACY FOR NONE:  
THE CONUNDRUM OF PROTECTING 
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN A PERVASIVELY 
ELECTRONIC WORLD 
Frederick M. Joyce and Andrew E. Bigart* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Electronic communications technology in our nation is no longer 
merely pervasive, it is ubiquitous.  We drive to work in automobiles that 
allow us to navigate via GPS, communicate with wireless phone systems, 
and, if faced with an emergency, contact an emergency help center at the 
push of a button.  At the office, we spend our days sending emails or 
engaging in telephone conversations with employer-provided 
computers, hand-held devices, and wireless and wireline telephones.  
Back home, we relax by talking to friends and family on cellular phones, 
sending text messages, and editing Internet blog postings.   
While the benefits of advanced communications technology are 
apparent, there is a dawning realization that the spread of these 
technologies at home and at work may have come at a price.  The fact is 
that every time we venture into this ubiquitous electronic world, the 
odds are high that the government, or someone, may be monitoring or 
recording all of our communications and movements.   
This Article examines how a wide array of federal laws such as the 
Wiretap Act,1 the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act2 
(“CALEA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act3 (“ECPA”), the 
Stored Communications Act4 (“SCA”), and the Foreign Intelligence 
                                                 
*  Frederick “Rick” M. Joyce is chair of the Communications Group at Venable LLP law 
firm in Washington, D.C.  His telecommunications work includes domestic and 
international telecom regulations and treaties, appellate and civil litigation matters, and 
state and federal communications legislation, with a particular emphasis on wireless 
communications and electronic media.  Andrew E. Bigart is an associate in the Regulatory 
Group at Venable LLP. 
1 Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral 
Communications, ch. 119, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2511 (2000)). 
2 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 
Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511; 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000)). 
3 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, ch. 119, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510)). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 2701. 
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Surveillance Act5 (“FISA”), not only permit the government to monitor 
and intercept electronic communications and data, but also place a duty 
on businesses to cooperate with these investigative efforts.  These laws, 
originally intended to strike a reasonable balance between privacy rights 
and law enforcement needs, did not anticipate heightened “Homeland 
Security” concerns or the recent technological revolution.  Consequently, 
the current state of the law has left government, businesses, and private 
citizens without a clear sense of their legal rights, obligations, and 
liabilities.   
A. Privacy Risks in an Increasingly Electronic World 
Over the past decade, U.S. courts have struggled to apply this 
complex array of electronic privacy laws to an equally complex if not 
bewildering array of communications technologies and applications.  
Previously, courts dealt mainly with conventional telephone wiretaps 
under these statutes; today, courts must apply decades-old law to a wide 
range of emerging technologies including cellular telephones, Internet 
communications, email, blogs, instant messaging, voice over internet 
protocol (“VOIP”) communications, packet-sniffing systems, keylogging 
programs, and other emerging technologies.6   
Businesses face similar dilemmas in trying to strike a reasonable 
balance between the obvious benefits of providing employees with 
comprehensive electronic communications tools, versus the risk that the 
electronic activities of their employees could lead to legal liability or 
network harm for the enterprise.  Employers, not unlike modern courts, 
struggle to understand electronic privacy laws to the point where the 
purchase and deployment of ostensibly useful electronic devices can be 
constrained by concerns about potential legal liability.   
This nascent conflict between electronic privacy laws and 
communications technology has led to two disturbing trends.  First, 
without clear legal limits, the government has begun to expand its 
electronic surveillance operations to a degree not contemplated by the 
original laws or supported by the majority of U.S. citizens.7  Second, this 
                                                 
5 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000)). 
6 See e.g., Casey Holland, Note, Neither Big Brother Nor Dead Brother: The Need for a New 
Fourth Amendment Standard Applying to Emerging Technologies, 94 KY. L.J. 393, 394-95 (2005). 
7 David Jefferson, NEWSWEEK Poll: American’s Wary of NSA Spying, Newsweek (Web 
Exclusive), May 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12771821/site/newsweek.  
“According to the latest NEWSWEEK poll, 53 percent of Americans think the NSA’s 
surveillance program ‘goes too far in invading people’s privacy,’ while 41 percent see it as 
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confusing and uncertain legal landscape makes compliance with the law 
virtually impossible, to the extent that anyone who endeavors to comply 
with electronic privacy laws may nevertheless end up in court.   
B. NSA Surveillance Cases Raise the Stakes 
The recent ruckus over the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) 
warrantless electronic surveillance program reflects a troubling 
escalation of this electronic privacy conflict.  According to publicly 
available information, these NSA surveillance programs involved 
intercepting conversations or mining customer data without first 
obtaining court authority as arguably required by statute.8  The first NSA 
program involved the monitoring of virtually all international telephone 
communications in order to identify potential terrorists.9  The other 
program involved NSA requests to telephone carriers that they turn over 
all customer call records; the NSA would then sift through these records 
for links to terrorists.10   
The litigation that these NSA programs spawned suggests that the 
increscent conflict between electronic privacy rights, law enforcement 
activities, and our outdated electronic privacy laws has reached nearly 
pandemic levels.  Multiple cases have been filed throughout the U.S. in 
response to the NSA surveillance programs.  The plaintiffs in these cases 
are not accused terrorists or bad guys, they are ordinary telephone 
customers.  The defendants are not just the NSA and the government 
entities that authorized these surveillance programs; they include almost 
every major telecommunications carrier in the U.S.  Moreover, although 
the U.S. Department of Justice recently decided to subject these NSA 
                                                                                                             
a necessary tool to combat terrorism.”  Id.  Further, the poll indicates that 57% of Americans 
believe that the White House went too far in expanding presidential power in light of the 
data mining revelation.  Id. 
8 See, e.g., Federal Court Strikes Down NSA Warrantless Surveillance Program, ACLU, 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/26489prs20060817.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2007) (noting that the warrantless surveillance program was in direct violation of FISA, 
which requires the executive branch to obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic 
surveillance of Americans). 
9 See, e.g., James Reisen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2005, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/21nsa.html?ex= 
1292821200& en=91d434311b0a7ddc&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (reporting that the 
president authorized the NSA to intercept communications where at least one end of the 
communication was outside of the United States.). 
10 See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls, USA TODAY, 
May 10, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm 
(reporting that the NSA used data provided by AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth to analyze 
calling patterns). 
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surveillance programs to prior judicial review, the facts disclosed in 
these proceedings cast a disturbing light on the vast scope of electronic 
surveillance in the United States today and the relative ease with which 
it can be accomplished.   
In some respects, public outrage over the NSA’s surveillance 
activities,11 particularly the lack of judicial oversight, misses a larger 
point that is the crux of this Article.  New communications technologies 
raise new privacy concerns, concerns that are not well protected under 
the current statutory framework.  A threat to privacy rights arises not 
only from an executive office or Department of Justice unchecked by 
judicial review, but also from the proliferation of new communications 
technologies that present the government, or private entities, with 
virtually unlimited opportunities to monitor communications and 
individual movements with or without judicial supervision.  The federal 
framework of laws intended to prevent electronic technology from 
invading legitimate privacy interests is now rickety and unequal to the 
task.   
To see how we arrived at this critical juncture, this Article examines 
the history and development of electronic privacy laws in the U.S.  Then, 
this Article reviews recent case law to demonstrate how courts have 
struggled to apply electronic privacy laws to rapidly evolving electronic 
technology, comments on the need for congressional action, and offers 
suggestions for managing electronic information within the current state 
of the law.   
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACY LAW 
A. Common Law, the Constitution, and the Communications Act of 1934  
A discussion of state electronic privacy laws and rights is well 
beyond the scope of this Article; nevertheless, it is useful to note that 
federal electronic privacy laws, and the courts’ interpretations of them, 
have evolved from common law concepts of “invasion of privacy” and 
“intrusion upon seclusion.”12  For example, the common law concept of 
                                                 
11 Jefferson, supra note 7. 
12 See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Heutche v. United States, 414 
U.S. 898 (1973); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 
323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
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what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is central to many 
court interpretations of electronic privacy rights.13   
Although the Fourth Amendment protects persons from 
governmental searches and seizures, there is no express constitutional 
right of privacy.14  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court initially refused to 
extend the Fourth Amendment’s protections to private telephone 
communications.15  It was not until Katz v. United States that the Court 
reversed prior decisions and recognized that individuals have legitimate 
privacy interests in telephone and electronic communications.  
According to Katz, “what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”16  Nevertheless, because the Fourth Amendment operates 
primarily to protect citizens from government or state action, electronic 
privacy rights in most instances are governed by federal statutes, 
common law “invasion of privacy” claims, and, state privacy laws in 
those states that have adopted electronic privacy laws or constitutional 
privacy provisions.17   
While it took the Court several decades to recognize legitimate 
privacy interests in electronic communications, Congress recognized the 
need to protect against interception of communications as early as 1912.18  
                                                 
13 47 U.S.C. § 705 (2000); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (discussing 
thermal imaging in relation to reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Dunn, 
480 U.S. 294 (1987) (discussing the use of electronic monitoring devices in tracking drug 
suspects); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (discussing monitoring of telephone 
booth use). 
14 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
15 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928). 
16 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
17 See, e.g., Sarah DiLuzio, Comment, Workplace E-Mail: It’s Not as Private as You Might 
Think, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 741 (2000); Kevin B. Kopp, Comment, Electronic Communications in 
the Workplace: E-Mail Monitoring and the Right of Privacy, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 861 
(1998). 
18  What is known is that section 605 of the Federal Communications Act 
of 1934, prohibiting interception and disclosure of non-broadcast radio 
transmissions, was incorporated almost verbatim from section 27 of 
the Radio Act of 1927 [and] the prohibition on interception and 
disclosure contained in the Radio Act of 1927 [was] derived from 
section 4 of the Radio Act of 1912. . . .  All three of these acts—1912, 
1927, and 1934—prohibited disclosure of messages, not only by 
amateurs and others who might intercept radio transmissions, but also 
by employees of communications companies who, of necessity, have 
access to radio messages in the normal course of their jobs. 
Kent R. Middleton, Radio Privacy under Section 705(A): An Unconstitutional Oxymoron, 9 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 583, 588-90 (1995). 
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It was then that Congress granted the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“ICC”) authority to prohibit unauthorized persons from intercepting 
and divulging the contents of radio communications.19  The 
Communications Act of 1934 transferred the ICC’s authority over 
communications to the Federal Communications Commission, including 
the power to prohibit unauthorized persons from intercepting 
communications.20   
Over time, state and local law enforcement officials began to pay 
deference to federal electronic privacy statutes, even when it arguably 
was not required.  In part, this was because of the Supremacy Clause and 
the larger body of law that had evolved over the years under federal 
electronic privacy statutes.21  More recently, the USA PATRIOT Act 
empowered state and local prosecutors to use the federal laws in state 
court.  As a practical matter, the desire to avoid liability under federal 
electronic privacy statutes motivates continued deference toward them.22   
B. The Wiretap Act of 1968 
The current federal framework for electronic surveillance and 
individual privacy is composed of several different statutes that 
separately govern the surveillance of domestic subjects and matters 
involving foreign intelligence.  In the wake of the Katz decision, 
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act of 1968”).23  The Wiretap Act of 1968 set the 
blueprint for all subsequent privacy and surveillance laws by generally 
protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications while also 
permitting certain authorized interceptions.  For example, the Wiretap 
Act of 1968 authorized interceptions by law enforcement officers acting 
pursuant to a court order.24   
At the same time, the Wiretap Act of 1968 set unfortunate precedent 
for later electronic privacy laws by narrowly limiting the applicability of 
                                                 
19 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 11621172 (1927) (as codified at 47 U.S.C. § 81 
(2000)). 
20 Communications Act, ch. 5, 90 Pub. L. 351, 48 Stat. 1103 (1968) (as codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 605 (2000)). 
21 AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., THE ECPA, ISPS AND OBTAINING E-MAIL:  A PRIMER 
FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS (July 2005), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/ecpa_ 
isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf. 
22 Id. at 7. 
23 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 
Stat. 197, 211 (1968). 
24 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000). 
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the law to “wire” and “oral” communications, and, by failing to take into 
account available or looming technologies such as cordless telephones, 
cellular telephones, and other communication services.  By this measure, 
the Wiretap Act of 1968 failed to heed Justice Brandeis’s prophetic 
warning in Olmstead v. United States that “individual protection against 
specific abuses of power must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a 
changing world,” especially considering that “subtler and more far-
reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
Government.”25   
C. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
By 1986, Congress recognized the need to upgrade the 1968 Wiretap 
Act and passed the ECPA to account for new computer and 
telecommunication technologies.26  The ECPA, which continues to form 
the backbone of the current federal laws, extended wiretapping 
protections to cellular telephones, private networks, and intra-company 
communications while in transit or in storage.  Although it was designed 
to address anticipated changes in the communications industry, the 
drafters of the ECPA evidently did not contemplate the rise of the 
Internet as a major communications device or the range of new 
communications technologies that would rapidly develop in the ensuing 
decade.27   
Under current federal law, the interception of the contents of wire, 
oral, and electronic communications is regulated by the Wiretap Act of 
1968, as amended by the ECPA (collectively “the Wiretap Act”).28  The 
Wiretap Act defines “interception” as “the aural or other acquisition of 
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the 
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”29  “Electronic 
communication” means “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in 
                                                 
25 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928). 
26 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986). 
27 See Jonathan D. Barker, Note, Society’s Carnivores, Both Good and Bad. The Internet 
Wiretap: Why We Need it, and How it Should be Regulated, 74 UMKC L. REV. 945, 948 (2006) 
(noting that although Congress did design the ECPA to distinguish between different 
stages of communication, the legislation nevertheless was designed for an “industry that 
was only in its infancy”). 
28 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000). 
29 Id. § 2510(4). 
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part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system.”30   
Generally, the Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to intentionally 
intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or to intentionally 
disclose the contents of any such communication when there is reason to 
know that the information was obtained through unlawful 
interception.31  Violators are subject to fines and imprisonment of not 
more than five years.32  Moreover, any person whose wire, oral, or 
electronic communication is intercepted or disclosed in violation of the 
Wiretap Act may bring a civil action to recover from the person or entity 
that engaged in that violation.33   
The statute defines an “electronic communications system” as any 
“wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo optical or photo electronic facilities 
for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any 
computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic 
storage of such communications.”34  “Electronic storage” means any 
“temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication 
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof, or any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communications service for purposes of 
backup protection.”35   
The Wiretap Act permits the interception of communications using a 
pen register or a trap and trace device.  Under the statute, the installation 
or use of a pen register or trap and trace device without first obtaining a 
court order is prohibited, unless the device is used by a provider of wire 
or electronic communication service (a) for the operation, maintenance, 
and testing of the service or the protection of the rights or property of the 
service provider; (b) to record the fact that the communication was 
initiated or completed in order to protect the service provider or another 
provider furnishing service toward the completion of the 
communications; or (c) where the consent of the user of that service has 
been obtained.36  Pen registers are devices or processes used to record or 
decode dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information of 
outbound wire or electronic communications.  Similarly, trap and trace 
                                                 
30 Id. § 2510(12). 
31 Id. § 2511(1). 
32 Id. § 2511(4). 
33 Id. § 2511(5). 
34 Id. § 2510(14). 
35 Id. § 2510(17). 
36 Id. § 2511(2)(h). 
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devices or processes capture the electronic or other impulses that 
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, 
and signaling information identifying the source of an incoming 
communication.   
There are several exemptions to the Wiretap Act’s prohibitions.  For 
example, the “service provider exemption” states that it is not unlawful 
for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee or agent of a 
provider of wire or electronic communications service whose facilities 
are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to 
intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his 
employment while engaged in any activity that is necessarily incident to 
the rendition of his service or the protection of the rights or property of 
the provider of that service.37  There are also several exemptions that 
cover the interception of communications for law enforcement purposes, 
including § 2511(2)(a)(ii), which authorizes providers of wire or 
electronic communications services, landlords, custodians, and other 
persons to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to law 
enforcement to intercept communications or conduct electronic 
surveillance pursuant to a court order or other written mandate from a 
government official, such as the U.S. Attorney General.   
The “consent” exemption makes it lawful for a person “not acting 
under color of law” to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication 
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the 
parties to the communication has given prior consent to the 
interception.38  A number of states maintain more restrictive laws that 
require consent from all parties to a communication before interception 
is lawful.39  In addition, the statute permits persons to intercept or access 
electronic communications made through an electronic communication 
system that is configured so that the electronic communications are 
“readily accessible to the general public.”40   
The “general public exemption” assumes that there are some forms 
of communication that have no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”41  
                                                 
37 Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).  Except that a provider of wire communication service to the public 
may not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service 
quality control checks.  Id. 
38 Id. § 2511(2)(c). 
39 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-5-5 (requiring all party 
consent for intentionally interception of a communication) 
40 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). 
41 A similar exemption for stored data that is available to the general public applies 
under the SCA, described below.  In terms of communications open to the pubic, the 
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The legislative history of the Wiretap Act reflects congressional intent to 
make unlawful only the interception of communications that would 
reasonably be deemed “private.”42  This statutory exception creates 
problems for many modern forms of communications over “open” or 
shared networks, such as the Internet, that might not have been 
anticipated when the statute was drafted.  Absent proof that electronic 
communications using shared networks or Internet-protocols would not 
be readily available to the general public, it may be left to the courts to 
determine whether these electronic communications are protected under 
the Wiretap Act.   
D. The Stored Communications Act 
Enacted as Title II to the ECPA, the SCA43 makes it unlawful for a 
provider of an electronic communications service to knowingly divulge 
the contents of a communication while in electronic storage.44  It also 
prohibits a person or entity providing remote computing services from 
knowingly divulging the contents of any communication which is 
carried or maintained on that service.45  A “remote computing service” 
means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing 
services by means of an electronic communication system.46   
However, there are several exemptions for disclosure of stored 
communications, including several exemptions that allow a service 
provider to divulge the contents of a communication.  A service provider 
may divulge electronic communications with the lawful consent of the 
originator or an addressee or intended recipient of the communication.47  
Determining which persons or parties are the “addressee” or “intended 
recipient” can be difficult, as shown in the cases that have addressed the 
                                                                                                             
Wiretap Act also states that it is not unlawful to intercept radio communications that are 
transmitted by any broadcasting station for use by the general public or for a provider of 
electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication 
was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing 
service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that 
service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(g). 
42 For a detailed history of the Wiretap Act and congressional intent, see United States v. 
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 
107-20. 
43 Pub. L. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1860, 201[1] (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). 
45 Id. § 2702(b)(2). 
46 Id. § 2711(2). 
47 Id. § 2702(b)(1). 
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issue, particularly with respect to personal emails sent to or from 
employees.48   
Other exemptions:  a service provider may disclose a stored 
electronic communication to an employee, to a person who is authorized 
to view the communication, to a person whose facilities are used to 
forward the communications to its destination, or to any person as may 
be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection 
of the rights or property of the service provider.49  A service provider 
may disclose a stored electronic communication in the normal course of 
business while engaged in any activity which is necessarily incident to 
the rendition of service or to protect the rights or property of the 
provider.50   
Additionally, a service provider must disclose electronic 
communications to a governmental entity pursuant to a warrant for 
communications stored for six months; for communications stored 
longer than six months, the service provider must disclose the 
communications to a governmental entity with a warrant or if the 
government entity provides prior notice to the subscriber and either (1) 
uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute 
or a federal or state grand jury; or (2) obtains a court order for the 
disclosure.51  The service provider must disclose such information to a 
law enforcement agency if the contents were inadvertently obtained by 
the service provider and appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, 
pursuant to provisions of the Crime Control Act, or if the provider 
reasonably believes that an emergency involving danger of death or 
serious injury to any person requires disclosure of the information with 
delay.52   
E. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
In 1994, Congress passed CALEA to aid law enforcement in its effort 
to conduct surveillance of citizens via digital telephone networks.53  The 
                                                 
48 See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Bartnicki v. United States, 532 U.S. 
514 (2001). 
49 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). 
50 Id. § 2702(b)(5) (except that the provider cannot use random monitoring except for 
mechanical or quality control checks). 
51 Id. § 2703. 
52 Id. 
53 Pub. L. 103-414, tit. I, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).  The purpose, in part, is “to make clear a 
telecommunications carrier’s duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for 
law enforcement purposes.”  Id. 
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Act obliges telephone companies to enable law enforcement agencies to 
tap any phone conversations carried out over their networks and to 
make available call detail records.54  CALEA also stipulates that it must 
not be possible for a person to detect that a conversation is being 
monitored.55   
Additionally, CALEA requires telecommunication carriers to ensure 
that all of their equipment, facilities, and services are capable of allowing 
government agents to intercept customer or subscriber 
communications.56  Specifically, CALEA requires carriers to maintain 
equipment that:  (1) permits the government, pursuant to court order, to 
intercept all wire or electronic communications carried by the carrier; (2) 
permits the government to access call-identifying information; (3) 
delivers the intercepting communications or call-identifying information 
to the government; and (4) facilitates such interceptions and access to 
call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of 
interference.57  CALEA does not apply to information services, that is, 
services that generate, store, or process information including electronic 
publishing and electronic messaging services.58  Telecommunications 
carriers that fail to honor the statute’s requirements face civil fines of up 
to $10,000 a day.59   
F. Customer Proprietary Network Information 
Customer proprietary network information (“CPNI”) is the data 
collected by telecommunications carriers about a customer’s telephone 
calls.60  “It includes the time, date, duration and destination number of 
                                                 
54 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000). 
55 Id. § 1002(a)(4). 
56 Id. § 1002(a). 
57 Id. § 1002(a).  “The term ‘call-identifying information’ means dialing or signaling 
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each 
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, 
or service of a telecommunications carrier.”  Id. § 1001(2). 
58 Id. § 1002(b). 
59 18 U.S.C. § 2522(c) (2000). 
60 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1). 
The term ‘customer proprietary network information’ means (A) 
information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, 
destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications 
service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier, 
and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by 
virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information 
contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or 
telephone toll service received by a customer or carrier. 
Id. 
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each call, the type of network a consumer subscribes to, and any other 
information that appears on the consumer’s telephone bill.”61  For a long 
time, telecommunications companies were able to sell this data to third 
party companies for marketing purposes.62  Faced with growing 
complaints about unwanted telephone solicitations and other marketing 
activities, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress adopted 
amendments to the Communications Act to require telecommunications 
companies to obtain customers’ approval prior to sharing their CPNI 
with third parties.63   
Section 222 of the Communications Act, which contains the CPNI 
provisions, requires telecommunications carriers “to protect the 
confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other 
telecommunication carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers, 
including telecommunication carriers reselling telecommunications 
services provided by a telecommunications carrier.”64  The original 
impetus for § 222 was consumer protection; it was intended to cut down 
on unwanted marketing and advertising solicitations of telephone 
customers.65  Nevertheless, the NSA surveillance programs have thrust 
§ 222 of the Communications Act squarely into the electronic privacy 
debate, as it appears that some of the surveillance activities involved the 
culling and screening of CPNI data.   
G. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the USA PATRIOT Act 
In 1978, Congress enacted FISA and authorized the government to 
conduct electronic surveillance of foreign agents within the United 
States.66  FISA also created an exclusive court of review which has 
jurisdiction over applications for electronic surveillance of foreign agents 
within the United States.67   The court has jurisdiction to review the 
                                                 
61 Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), CPNI, http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
cpni/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
62 Id.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required customers to “opt-in” before their 
CPNI was sold to marketing companies; however, there was debate over whether “opt-
out” was a permissible option instead of the “opting-in” interpretation of the Act.  Id. 
63 47 U.S.C. § 222. 
64 Id. § 222(a). 
65 S. 652, 104th Cong. (1996).  The purpose of the bill was “[t]o promote competition and 
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies.”  Id. 
66 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000). 
67 Id. § 1803(a). 
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denial of any application for authority to conduct electronic 
surveillance.68   
In 2001, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which amended FISA to account 
for new technologies and increased threats.69  In particular, the USA 
PATRIOT Act expanded the pen register and trap and trace laws to 
include Internet communications and software programs in addition to 
telephone communications.70  The USA PATRIOT Act permits the 
government to use pen registers to capture a vast amount of information, 
including telephone numbers, comprehensive “dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information,” and potential Internet-related 
information such as email and IP addresses.71  In addition, the USA 
PATRIOT Act permits the government, without court approval, to share 
the contents of intercepted electronic communications among federal law 
enforcement and intelligence personnel.72  In essence, the Act has 
enlarged the scope of surveillance statutes, expanded the coverage of 
those statutes to include new targets, lowered the government’s 
threshold to engage in surveillance, and placed additional 
responsibilities on communications providers.73   
As examined in this Article, one view of the NSA surveillance 
program is that it involved the crashing together of all of these statutes in 
a very public and unfortunate way.  As best as can be told from the 
public record, the NSA program was not limited to “foreign agents”; 
instead, it culled electronic communications and records of thousands of 
telephone customers who were never considered threats to our national 
interests.  We now know that the FISA procedures, which were intended 
to be a check on this type of government surveillance, were never 
                                                 
68 Id. § 1803(b).  The FISA Court of Review is composed of three judges from the U.S. 
District Courts or Circuit Courts, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Id. 
69 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 
Stat. 212 (2001).  The majority of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act that were due to end 
were renewed in March 2006.  See USA PATRIOT Act Improvement Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-77, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections and 
titles of the United States Code). 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1039-40 (D. Md. 1972); 
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 50 (2001). 
71 Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 50 (2001). 
72 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2000). 
73 Jaime S. Gorelick, John H. Harwood & Heather Zachary, Navigating Communications 
Regulation in the Wake of 9/11, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 351, 354 (2005). 
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invoked.74  Despite all of Congress’s efforts over the decades to balance 
law enforcement needs with  reasonable expectations of privacy, from 
the plaintiffs’ point of view, the NSA surveillance programs ran 
roughshod over the privacy rights of thousands of U.S. citizens.   
III.  NEW TECHNOLOGIES CHALLENGE THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
It is the central premise of this Article that the federal framework of 
electronic privacy laws is sorely in need of an overhaul in light of today’s 
ubiquitous communications technologies.  A random sampling of cases 
involving alleged violations of the ECPA and other electronic privacy 
laws reveals a crazy-quilt of fact-specific outcomes.  There is no unitary 
theme to these case precedents; they offer little practical guidance to 
those who engage in electronic communications and to those who are 
entrusted to protect electronic communications and records.   
A. Electronic Messaging  Services 
A recurring theme in ECPA jurisprudence is the difficulty of courts 
in determining whether electronic communications are “in transit” and 
thus subject to the more strenuous provisions of the Wiretap Act, or, 
“stored communications” subject to the less burdensome SCA 
provisions.  Given the widespread and expanding use of various forms 
of online communications, this is a statutory interpretation problem that 
is unlikely to go away absent revisions to federal law.   
In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., a California federal 
district court engaged in one of the most comprehensive discussions of 
“the legal boundaries of . . . privacy in this interconnected, electronic-
communication age, one in which thoughts and ideas that would have 
been spoken personally and privately in ages past are now instantly text-
messaged to friends and family via hand-held, computer assisted 
electronic devises[.]”75  The Quon case arose from an internal 
investigation by the Ontario Police Department into the allegedly 
personal and illegal use of department-issued pagers by several 
employees.76  The department had previously entered into a contract 
with Arch Wireless Operating Company, Inc. to provide its employees 
                                                 
74 See Dan Eggen, Records on Spy Program Turned Over to Lawmakers, Wash. Post, Feb 1, 
2007, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
01/31/AR2007013100921_pf.html (noting the administration’s decision, in light of 
congressional and public pressure, to replace the controversial NSA warrantless 
surveillance program with a program subject to the FISA secret court). 
75 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal 2006). 
76 Id. at 1121-22. 
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with pagers and other wireless communication devices.77  The 
department required that all of its employees review and sign the 
department’s equipment use policy which applied to “the use of any 
city-owned computer equipment, computer peripherals, city networks, 
the Internet, e-mail services or other city computer related services.”78  
The policy further stated that the department recorded and reviewed 
access to all Internet sites and that the department reserved the “right to 
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, 
with or without notice.  Users should have no expectation of privacy or 
confidentiality when using these resources.”79   
At various times, the department informed Quon, one of the 
plaintiffs in the case, that the department’s pagers were considered to be 
e-mail messages that fell within the department’s policy and were 
therefore subject to audit.80  The department, however, “had an unstated 
policy of agreeing not to audit the use of the pagers whenever overages 
existed so long as the personnel in question paid the department for the 
overage.”81  In any case, the department did not have the ability to 
review pager messages without first contacting Arch Wireless and 
requesting that they generate a transcript of the messages.82  Eventually, 
the department decided to change its informal policy and audited the 
pager transcripts to determine to what extent the overages were caused 
by personal use and contacted Arch Wireless for copies of the pagers’ 
transcripts.83  Prior to providing the department with the transcripts, 
Arch Wireless “confirmed that the pagers were owned by the city and 
that the request came from the designated contact person.  After 
satisfying itself of these two points, Arch Wireless provided transcripts 
of the contents of the messages sent and received by the pagers during 
the time in question.”84   
Upon reviewing the transcripts, the department determined that 
Quon had been using his pager for personal reasons, including the 
transmission of sexually explicit messages to his wife and girlfriend.85  
The transcripts were turned over to Internal Affairs who took action 
                                                 
77 Id. at 1122-23. 
78 Id. at 1123. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1124. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 1125-26. 
84 Id. at 1126. 
85 Id. 
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against the plaintiffs.86  The collective plaintiffs, in turn, filed suit against 
the department and Arch Wireless, asserting violation of the SCA.87   
In defense, Arch Wireless argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) permits 
a carrier to disclose the contents of a stored electronic communication 
when done “‘with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or 
intended recipient of such communication [in the case of an electronic 
communication service], or the subscriber in the case of remote 
computing service.’”88  The key issue focused on whether “the service 
provided by Arch Wireless—that is, of being able to retrieve for its 
subscribers text messages that have been sent over its communication 
network and are held in long-term storage on its computers—constitutes 
a remote computing service, or, rather, is more properly characterized as 
an electronic communication service.”89  According to the court, the 
classification of Arch Wireless’s service would determine whether Arch 
Wireless was exempt under the statute.90   
Arch Wireless argued that because it stored the messages on a 
computer, the service was akin to e-mail and therefore a remote 
computing service.  But the court noted that unlike email, which permits 
the original sender to access the message even when stored, the text-
messages could not be retrieved without Arch Wireless’s assistance.91  As 
such, the court addressed whether such a “direct-accessibility feature” 
was a necessary component of a remote computing service.92  Although 
the plaintiffs argued that interconnectivity was a key element of a remote 
computing service, the court found that the statute’s language did not 
specifically require or even address interconnectivity.93  According to the 
court, “[u]nder the SCA, the centrality a computer plays in facilitating 
the communication is key to Congress’ definition of a remote computing 
service.”94  The court found this definition no longer particularly relevant 
considering the ubiquity of computers as forms of electronic 
communication.95  For example, the transmission of text messages 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1128.  Quon also asserted violations of the Fourth Amendment and state law 
claims for violations of the California Constitution, California Penal Code, invasion of 
privacy, and defamation.  Id. 
88 Id. at 1130 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3)). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1131. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1132. 
95 Id. at 1133. 
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probably satisfied the definition of an electronic communication whereas 
the long-term storage of such messages might qualify as a remote 
computing service.96  Acknowledging that Arch Wireless’s services 
incorporated elements of both types of services, the court held that given 
that the retrieval of messages in long-term storage was at issue, 
§ 2702(b)(3)’s subscriber exception applied.97   
Next, the court addressed whether the department had violated 
Quon’s reasonable expectation of privacy by reviewing his messages.98  
According to the court, the department failed to provide Quon with fair 
notice that the pager communications were open to public view because 
of its contradictory official and informal policies.99  The court found that 
the department’s informal policy of not reviewing the contents of 
messages so long as the user paid the overage charges undercut the 
formal policy provision allowing the department to review and monitor 
all pager messages.100  Specifically, the court noted that  
it is unreasonable to expect that an employee would 
assume that some other unstated norm should inform 
their opinion on how much privacy to expect in using an 
employer’s equipment once that employer expressly 
informs his or her employees of an actual policy 
regarding the use of that very equipment.101   
Since Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages the 
department’s audit was not justified.102  The outcome of the claim 
depended largely on whether the department read the transcripts in 
order to discover misconduct or to improve efficiency.103  As such, the 
court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment so that a 
jury could determine the purpose of the audit.104   
                                                 
96 Id. at 1136-37. 
97 Id. at 1137. 
98 Id. at 1140. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1141. 
101 Id. at 1142. 
102 Id. at 1143-44. 
103 Id. at 1146. 
104 Id. 
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B. Internet-Based Communications 
Email has largely supplanted the telephone as the main form of 
communications in the business world.105  From the law enforcement 
perspective, an agent can examine email by “acquiring a Title I content 
warrant, a Title II store communications order, a Title III pen register 
order, or a FISA warrant . . . .”106  Perhaps paradoxically, given the 
ubiquitous nature of email and the use of Internet-based message 
services, the courts continue to grapple with statutory definitions for 
these technologies.  Defining these technologies is a critical predicate to 
determining the extent to which they are entitled to privacy protection 
under federal law.   
The recent case of United States v. Councilman underscores the 
difficulty of squeezing twenty-first-century technology into twentieth-
century laws.107  In Councilman, defendant Bradford C. Councilman was 
the vice-president of “an online rare and out-of-print book listing 
service” called Interloc.108  In addition to the book listing service, Interloc 
provided customers with email accounts and acted as a service provider 
for these accounts.109  To better target customers and respond to growing 
competition from Amazon.com, Interloc intercepted and copied email 
communications sent from Amazon.com to its customers before 
delivering the messages into customer email accounts.110  The 
government charged Councilman with Wiretap Act violations due to his 
intercepting emails.111  In defense, Councilman argued that the 
intercepted e-mails were in electronic storage at the time and therefore 
not subject to the Wiretap Act’s prohibition against intercepting 
electronic communications.112  The district court dismissed the 
indictment, a divided panel of the First Circuit affirmed; an en banc 
panel reversed and remanded.113   
                                                 
105 Ferris Research, http://www.ferris.com/research-library/industry-statistics/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2007).  Industry statistics show that in 2006, business email users sent over 
6 trillion non-spam e-mail messages.  Id.  Every day, approximately 25 billion non-spam e-
mail messages are sent.  Id. 
106 Holland, supra note 6, at 407. 
107 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). 
108 Id. at 70. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 70-71. 
112 Id. at 71. 
113 Id. at 69, 85. 
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On rehearing, the First Circuit disagreed with Councilman’s 
assertion and found that the e-mail messages were electronic 
communications.114  The crux of the analysis focused on the definition of 
electronic communication and whether communications that went into 
momentary electronic storage qualified as electronic communications.115  
Accordingly, the court began its analysis by reviewing the language of 
the Wiretap Act, concluding that the “ECPA’s plain text does not clearly 
state whether a communication is still an ‘electronic communication’ 
within the scope of the Wiretap Act when it is in electronic storage 
during transmission.  Applying canons of construction does not resolve 
the question. Given this continuing ambiguity, we turn to the legislative 
history.”116  Based on the Act’s legislative history, the court found that 
there was no evidence that Congress intended to exclude the temporary 
storage of an electronic communication during transmission from the 
scope of the Wiretap Act.117  As a result, the court concluded that the 
term “electronic communication” as used in the Wiretap Act included 
the temporary storage of electronic communications.118   
The First Circuit reached its ultimate decision based primarily on its 
interpretation of the Wiretap Act’s legislative history, rather than on an 
analysis of the statute itself.  Given the election to steer around the plain 
language of the statute, it is perhaps not surprising that other courts 
have reached different conclusions with respect to their treatment of 
email under the Wiretap Act.119  Similarly, several courts interpreting 
state statutes similar to ECPA have found that email is a recorded 
medium in which the communication is sent to other computers and is 
therefore subject to interception since the sender would not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.120   
                                                 
114 Id. at 79. 
115 Id. at 72-79. 
116 Id. at 76. 
117 Id. at 76-79. 
118 Id. at 79.    
119 See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the interception of a private electronic email which was stored on a bulletin 
board did not fall within the scope of the Wiretap Act); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 
302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (endorsing the Steve Jackson view that communications 
cannot be intercepted while in electronic storage). 
120 See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (standing for the 
proposition that the sender has no privacy interest in the email communication because the 
recipient’s computer would record the email); Holland, supra note 6, at 409-10 (discussing 
State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255 (Wash. 2002)). 
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Courts have also struggled to determine where web sites and 
Internet “bulletin boards” fit within the Wiretap Act’s statutory 
framework.  In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, an airline employer had used 
access codes given by Konop, an employee, to other individuals to access 
Konop’s website, where unfavorable comments about the employer had 
been posted.121  Konop claimed that the airline had unlawfully 
intercepted private electronic communications in violation of the 
Wiretap Act.122   
The Konop court considered whether the airline had violated an 
employee’s privacy rights by accessing his private website.123  The court 
noted that the intersection of the ECPA and SCA was a “convoluted[ ] 
area of the law” and that “[c]ourts have struggled to analyze problems 
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory 
framework . . . .”124  After reviewing the legislative history, the court 
concluded that Congress’s intent in enacting the ECPA was to protect 
private electronic communications.125  Nevertheless, the Internet makes it 
almost impossible to determine the identity of web visitors or to 
determine whether a visitor was actually eligible to view a given 
website.126  The Ninth Circuit held that the website qualified as an 
electronic communication under the Wiretap Act, but that websites can 
only be intercepted under the Wiretap Act during active transmission 
and not while a message is in electronic storage.127  Consequently, the 
Konop court found that the airline had not violated the Wiretap Act.   
Next, the Konop court considered whether the airline had violated 
the SCA by accessing the employee’s website without proper 
authorization.128  The SCA exempts from its requirements persons who 
are users of the service or who are the intended recipients of the 
communication.129  Finding that the airline was not an authorized user of 
the website, the court dismissed the airline’s motion for summary 
judgment.130  The Konop court recognized that “until Congress brings the 
laws in line with modern technology, protection of the Internet and 
                                                 
121 302 F.3d at 872. 
122 Id. at 873. 
123 Id. at 874. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 875. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 875-76, 878. 
128 Id. at 879. 
129 Id. at 880. 
130 Id. 
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websites such as Konop’s will remain a confusing and uncertain area of 
the law.”131   
The courts and government have strained to fit other Internet-based 
communications technologies, such as VOIP and instant messaging, into 
the existing federal privacy law framework.132  VOIP technology allows 
users to place what appear to be traditional telephone calls, but instead 
the voice data is transferred via Internet protocol (where multiple 
packets of unrelated voice data are essentially “streamed” together over 
broadband connections, and then reassembled on the receiver’s end of 
the communication) rather than dedicated telephone circuits.133  Internet-
based communication technologies strain the existing legal system 
because courts have often refused to “recognize a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ in Internet electronic communications reasoning 
that, as the Internet is public in nature, communications therein should 
receive a disfavored privacy protection status.”134   
Although VOIP services are not considered “telecommunications 
common carrier” services, such as conventional telephone service, the 
FCC recently concluded, after considerable coaxing from the FBI, that 
CALEA applies to facilities-based broadband Internet access services and 
interconnected VOIP.135 According to the Commission, Congress 
intended the term “telecommunications carrier” in CALEA to apply to a 
broader group of entities than in the Communications Act.136  “In today’s 
technological environment, where IP-based broadband networks are 
rapidly replacing the legacy narrowband circuit-switched network, 
various types of packet-mode equipment are increasingly being 
deployed to ‘originate, terminate, or direct communications’ to their 
intended destinations.”137   
                                                 
131 Id. at 874. 
132 A report in 2004 by the Pew Institute indicates that over 53 million Americans use 
instant messaging and that over 11 million employees use instant messaging at work.  
EULYNN SHIU & AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, HOW 
AMERICANS USE INSTANT MESSAGING i, ii (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
pdfs/PIP_Instantmessage_Report.pdf. 
133 Barker, supra note 27, at 952-53. 
134 Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. Harris, Voice Over Internet 
Protocol and the Wiretap Act:  Is Your Conversation Protected, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 122-23 
(2005). 
135 In the Matter of Communications Assistance for law Enforcement Act and Broadband 
Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
FCC 05-153, ¶ 8 (Sept. 23, 2005). 
136 Id. ¶ 10. 
137 Id. ¶ 11. 
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The Commission concluded that CALEA covers all facilities-based 
providers of broadband Internet access including wireline, cable modem, 
satellite, wireless, fixed wireless, and broadband via powerline 
providers.138  Specifically, the Commission found that that CALEA 
created three categories of telecommunication services to cover pure 
telecommunications (fully covered by CALEA), pure information (not 
covered by CALEA), and hybrid services (partially covered by 
CALEA).139  According to the Commission, broadband and VOIP 
services fall within the hybrid services tier and are therefore partially 
covered by CALEA.140   
Privacy groups attacked the Commission’s decision as contrary to 
CALEA’s statutory provisions and a threat to individual privacy.141  
However, in American Council on Education v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit 
denied a petition for review based on a Chevron deference analysis of the 
Commission’s Report and Order.142  The plaintiff had challenged the 
FCC’s decision on the grounds that the Commission, in proceedings 
implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, had previously 
classified broadband Internet access as information services.143  The court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s argument, citing differences between the two 
statutes and finding that the Commission’s decision to classify 
broadband Internet access under CALEA as a hybrid service was a 
“reasonable policy choice” under Chevron.144  In essence, the FCC is 
treating VOIP communications as akin to “common carriage” for 
purposes of CALEA’s law enforcement mandates; however, it may be up 
to the courts to determine whether VOIP communications will be 
afforded privacy protection under federal electronic privacy laws.   
C. Cellular Telephone Interceptions and Surveillance 
Another example of how technology has outgrown the existing legal 
framework is the use of “roving bugs” by law enforcement officials.  A 
“roving bug” occurs when a government agent, “with court approval 
and mobile-phone carrier assistance required by law[,] can exploit 
mobile phones over the air in such a way that microphones in handsets 
are activated and nearby conversations picked up by federal 
                                                 
138 Id. ¶ 24. 
139 Id. ¶ 16-18. 
140 Id. ¶ 24-45. 
141 Jay Lyman, FCC Criticized for VoIP Tapping Requirements, TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 11, 
2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/45416.html. 
142 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir 2006). 
143 Id. at 227-28. 
144 Id. at 228-36. 
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investigators.”145  In order to initiate the microphone in a mobile phone 
the carrier must first place the phone into a diagnostic mode.  Once this 
occurs, the microphone can pick up conversations in the area around the 
phone without the user knowing that the phone is recording.   
Although “roving bugs” have been recognized as legitimate 
surveillance tools for several years, a recent New York case demonstrates 
how the cellular telephone has expanded the scope, effectiveness, and 
invasiveness of such surveillance tools.146  In United States v. Tomero, the 
FBI requested and received court authorization to use roving bugs to 
record the conversations of several individuals associated with an 
organized crime family.147  The FBI used this authorization to record 
hundreds of hours of conversations through several cell phones, 
regardless of whether the phones were turned on or off.148  The court 
rejected all of the defendant’s constitutional and non-constitutional 
defenses.149  First, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the use of 
roving bugs was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because 
the warrant did not limit the search to a particular place.150  Second, the 
court held that the FBI’s warrant applications satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 2518 
because they indicated that alternative methods were unlikely to 
succeed, they targeted conversations that included at least one known 
subject, and because the government was only required to show “that 
the defendants moved often enough that the regular procedures for 
obtaining a warrant would inhibit the interception of some conversations 
needed for the investigation.”151   
In United States v. Forest, two defendants challenged their arrests for 
cocaine possession, claiming statutory and constitutional violations 
arising from data intercepted from their cellular phones by law 
enforcement officials who had previously obtained court authorization 
                                                 
145 Jeffrey Silva, Roving Bugs: Wiretap Law Can Turn Cell Phone into Microphone, RCR 
WIRELESS NEWS, Dec. 16, 2006, at 1. 
146 See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1122-24 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the 
constitutionality of “roving bugs” for interception of oral communications that are not 
transmitted via wire or electronic means); see also United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545. 553 
(5th Cir. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of “roving bugs” for the interception of oral 
communications that are not transmitted via wire or electronic means); United States v. 
Petti, 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035 (1993). 
147 462 F. Supp. 2d 565 (2006). 
148 Id. at 566-57. 
149 Id. at 572. 
150 Id. at 569. 
151 Id. at 572. 
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to intercept the conversations.152  The authorization also required the 
cellular provider to disclose to the government defendants’ subscriber 
information, toll records, and other relevant information.153  Based on 
information received through the cellular phone interceptions, law 
enforcement officials began conducting physical surveillance of the 
defendants, but found that they were unable to maintain constant visual 
contact.154  “In order to reestablish visual contact, a DEA agent dialed 
[defendant’s] cellular phone (without allowing it to ring) several times 
that day and used Sprint’s computer data to determine which cellular 
transmission towers were being ‘hit’ by [defendant’s] phone.  This ‘cell-
site data’ revealed the general location of [defendant].”155  The officers 
repeated this procedure in order to maintain their physical surveillance 
of the defendants.156   
On appeal, defendants argued that the government’s use of their cell 
phone data turned their phones into tracking devices in violation of the 
Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment.157  But the Sixth Circuit agreed 
with the district court’s finding that the cellular phone data was an 
electronic communication rather than a wire or oral communication.158  
As a result, the Circuit Court dismissed defendant’s request to suppress 
the evidence under the Wiretap Act because the Act only permitted 
suppression of wire or oral communications.159  Next, the court 
addressed defendant’s claim that the government’s use of his cellular 
phone as a tracking device violated  18 U.S.C. § 3117(a), governing the 
use of mobile tracking devices, and determined that § 3117 did not 
provide for suppression as a remedy to the government’s actions.160  The 
court also addressed the defendants’ argument that the government’s 
use of their cellular phones as tracking devices violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights, but held that defendants did not have a claim 
because their data was intercepted only while they traveled on public 
                                                 




156 Id. at 947-48. 
157 Id. at 948.  Another interesting issue is whether the location information obtained from 
the defendant’s cellular phones even qualifies as “call-identifying” data under CALEA.  For 
a further discussion of this issue, see Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns 
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 315 
(2004). 
158 Forest, 355 F.3d at 948-49.  The court acknowledged that there was a strong argument 
that “cell-site data is not a form of communication at all.”  Id. at 949. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 949-50. 
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highways. 161  Instead, the court noted that the cell-site data was “simply 
a proxy for [defendant’s] visually observable location.”162   
Tomero and Forest reveal how the government can easily intercept 
conversations or track individuals’ movements through cellular phones.  
In addition, some cellular phone carriers and private companies have 
begun offering products that allow cellular phone users to track the 
movements of other cellular phone users.  In late 2006, Boost Mobile, a 
pre-paid cellular phone service owned by Sprint, introduced a mobile-
tracking system service that allows users to track the whereabouts of 
friends.163  Loopt, the company that created the system, claims to have 
“developed safeguards to ensure that mobile-phone users are tracked 
only by people they know and only when they want to be found.”164  
Other cellular phone carriers have hesitated to implement similar 
systems because of privacy and safeguard concerns.  Verizon Wireless 
for example, has stated “concerns about making sure a tracking service is 
done right, . . .  The last thing we want to do is let a genie out of a bottle 
and find that the service is misused.”165   
D. Automobile Communications Surveillance 
Over the past few years, automobile manufacturers have begun to 
equip their vehicles with telecommunication devices that provide drivers 
with on-board services such as navigation, information services, 
emergency services, and road-side assistance.  These services generally 
operate through a combination of cellular and global positioning system 
technologies.  General Motors has incorporated this technology into at 
least 50 of its 2007 models.166  Although these systems provide drivers 
with important, and at times life-saving services, they also provide law 
enforcement officials with a powerful and tempting “roving bug” 
surveillance tool.   
As these services have become widespread, it has been left to the 
courts to determine whether they are covered under federal wiretap and 
surveillance laws.  In The Company v. United States, the Ninth Circuit 
considered “whether the statute governing private parties’ obligations to 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 951. 




166 Onstar, 2007 Onstar Equipped Vehicles, http://www.onstar.com/us_english/jsp/ 
equip_vehicles/07_vehicles.jsp (last visted Mar. 28, 2007). 
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assist the federal government in intercepting communications” required 
one such service provider to assist the government in intercepting 
conversations through the service.167  In that case, the FBI sought to use 
the Company’s auto service as a “roving bug” and obtained several court 
orders requiring the Company to help the FBI intercept conversations 
through the system.168  The lower court that granted the FBI’s requests 
determined that the service provider was a “telecommunications carrier” 
and “provider of wire or electronic communication service” under 18 
U.S.C. § 2518(4) and § 2522.169  Objecting to the use of its product for 
surveillance purposes, the Company expressed concern that “if no 
operator is on the line and only the FBI is listening in, there will be no 
response to the subscriber’s emergency signaled by the transmitted 
tone.”170   
On review, the Ninth Circuit considered the key question:  “When 
may a company, not a common carrier but possessing a unique ability to 
facilitate the interception of oral communications, be required to assist 
law enforcement in intercepting such communications?”171  Comparing 
the facts of the case to the ECPA’s statutory requirements, the court 
found that the conversations intercepted through the system qualified as 
“oral communications” under § 2510(3) because the occupants of the 
vehicle reasonably expected that their conversations were private and 
not subject to interception.172  Next, the court addressed whether the 
Company had an obligation to assist the FBI in intercepting the 
communications.173  In order to answer this question, the court had to 
determine whether the Company was a “provider of wire or electronic 
communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person” as 
required by § 2518(4).174  The Company claimed that it was not a 
provider of such a service because it did not operate the cellular service 
incorporated into the system.175  After analyzing the statute’s language, 
the court determined that the Company qualified as a “provider of wire 
or electronic communication service” because the Company billed the 
customers directly for the service and because the customers had no 
                                                 
167 349 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003). 
168 Id.; see Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared 
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 223 n.30 (2006). 
169 The Company, 349 F.3d at 1134. 
170 Id. at 1135. 
171 Id. at 1137. 
172 Id. at 1138. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 1139. 
175 Id. 
Joyce and Bigart: Liability for All, Privacy for None:  The Conundrum of Protecting
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1508 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
contact with the cellular telephone company.176  According to the court, 
“[t]he service-providing structure here is very much akin to 
circumstances in which an established long distance telephone carrier 
offers local phone service even though it does not own or operate any of 
the local infrastructure.”177  The court concluded that for purposes of 
§ 2518(4), the statute does distinguish between “those service providers 
that furnish their own facilities, and those service providers like the 
Company that do not.”178   
The court also held that the Company qualified as an “other person” 
under § 2518(4), noting that the term “other person” includes individuals 
or entities that provide a service to the targets of electronic surveillance 
and who are uniquely able to assist law enforcement officials in 
intercepting communications through their facilities or service.179  
Specifically, the court found that “The Company [was] uniquely situated 
to facilitate the interception of the oral communications within the 
vehicle . . . .”180  The court held that the Company qualified as an “other 
person” and fell within the purview of § 2518(4)’s requirements.181   
Having determined that the Company was required to comply with 
the ECPA’s provisions, the court addressed whether the FBI’s requests 
went too “far in interfering with the service provided by the Company” 
under § 2518, which required that the assistance be provided with a 
“minimum of interference with the services” of the provider.182  
Although the court recognized that § 2518 permits a certain level of 
interference, the court found under the facts of the case that the FBI’s 
requests were too obtrusive because they completely shut down the 
provider’s service.183  The court concluded that although the Company 
fell within the purview of § 2518(4) as both a “provider” and an “other 
person,” the district court erred by granting the FBI’s requests because 
                                                 
176 Id. at 1140. 
177 Id. 
179  Id. 
179 Id. at 1141-42. 
180 Id. at 1143. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1144. 
183 Id. at 1146.  See Dorothy L. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 
318 n.90 (2004); Eva Marie Dowdell, Note & Comment, You are Here!  Mapping the 
Boundaries of the Fourth Amendment with GPS Technology, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
109, 116 n.60 (2005). 
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the Company “could not assist the FBI without disabling the System in 
the monitored car.”184   
A dissenting judge opined that the FBI’s actions were in compliance 
with the federal statutes, and was not particularly swayed by the 
potential harm that this surveillance program could cause to the 
Company’s “emerging business . . . because people might not subscribe 
to its service if they become aware of [the] potential for court-ordered 
eavesdropping[.]”185  Of course, that was presumably why the service 
provider prosecuted this appeal:  to avoid having its safety and 
convenience product from intentionally becoming a primary tool for law 
enforcement activities.   
IV.  THE NSA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAW 
In adopting the ECPA, CALEA, and FISA, Congress intended to 
strike a balance between individual privacy interests and legitimate law 
enforcement needs.  Recent revelations about the NSA’s secret 
surveillance programs suggest that these statutes may no longer be 
capable of balancing these competing interests.  And, as discussed above, 
the proliferation of new technologies has given law enforcement new 
surveillance tools that further strain the existing legal framework and 
place increasing burdens on the judicial system to strike the appropriate 
balance. 
The foundation for Hepting and other related NSA surveillance cases 
was laid by the press.186  On December 16, 2005, The New York Times 
reported that President Bush had previously authorized the NSA to 
engage in the covert, warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens.187  The 
story immediately caused a public uproar that forced the government to 
defend its action as a key weapon in the fight against terrorism.   
In its defense, the government revealed select details about the 
program, including that:  (1) the program performed wiretaps on 
international communications between U.S. citizens and foreign entities; 
(2) the program was implemented by non-judicial “career professionals” 
at the NSA when they had reasonable grounds to suspect that a party to 
a communication was a member of a foreign terrorist organization; (3) 
                                                 
184 The Company, 349 F.3d at 1146. 
185 Id. at 1149. 
186 See infra text accompanying notes 207-15 (discussing Hepting). 
187 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
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the wiretaps targeted U.S. citizens; and (4) the government did not seek 
FISA or any other judicial warrants prior to beginning its surveillance.188  
Not surprisingly, litigation ensued.   
Similarly, in ACLU v. NSA, a group of citizens filed suit against the 
NSA challenging the constitutionality of the program under the Fourth 
Amendment.189  The plaintiffs consisted of individuals whose 
international telephone and internet communications were intercepted 
and recorded by the government.190  Engaging in a lengthy review of the 
judicial precedent concerning government electronic surveillance, the 
federal district court focused the bulk of its analysis on whether the 
executive branch had exceeded the scope of its constitutional powers and 
taken on a role traditionally reserved for the judiciary and Congress 
under the separation of powers.  For example, the court noted that in 
United States v. United States District Court,191 the Supreme Court 
established that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to seek 
a warrant prior to engaging in domestic security surveillance.192  The 
court went on to cite Justice Powell’s opinion for the proposition that the 
executive branch’s duty is to “enforce the laws, to investigate, and to 
prosecute . . . .  But those charged with this investigative and 
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize 
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”193   
In addition, the court noted that Congress designed FISA to provide 
the executive branch with a clear and well-defined framework for 
engaging in electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence.194  Further, 
the court noted that in enacting FISA, Congress had “made numerous 
concessions to stated executive needs.”  The problem identified by the 
court is that post-911, the government no longer seems satisfied to limit 
its operations as required under the current legal framework.  It seems 
that the executive branch implemented the NSA without regard to FISA 
or the Fourth Amendment.195  “The President of the United States, a 
creature of the same Constitution which gave us these Amendments, has 
undisputedly violated the Fourth in failing to procure judicial orders as 
                                                 
188 Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of the National Security Agency’s Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit the 
Rule of Law, 17 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 429, 432 (2006). 
189 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E. D. Mich 2006). 
190 Id. 
191 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
192 ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
193 Id. at 775. 
194 Id. at 773. 
195 Id. at 775. 
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required by FISA, and accordingly has violated the First Amendment 
Rights of these Plaintiffs as well.”196   
The government argued that it had not violated the Constitution 
because Congress had granted the president the power to use all 
necessary and appropriate force to prevent future terrorist attacks in the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) passed shortly after 
9/11.197  The court dismissed this argument because the AUMF does not 
address intelligence or surveillance, and, because FISA and the ECPA 
clearly state that surveillance may only be conducted pursuant to prior 
warrants.198  Additionally, the court also dismissed the government’s 
claim that the president’s inherent powers were sufficient to authorize 
the NSA program; in the end, the court granted the plaintiff’s request for 
a permanent injunction.199   
In response, the government filed an appeal with the Sixth Circuit.200  
In addition, approximately six months after the ACLU v. NSA opinion, 
the government voluntarily changed the NSA surveillance program so 
that the FISA court would review each surveillance request.201  Although 
many privacy advocates cheered the government’s decision and 
characterized the change as a “retreat,” the government continues to 
defend the president’s authority to engage in unauthorized 
wiretapping.202  At the same time, the government moved the Sixth 
Circuit to dismiss the lawsuit since it had subsequently placed the NSA 
program under FISA review.203  In its filing, the government stated that 
the plaintiffs’ challenge was moot because the challenged surveillance 
activity no longer existed.204  However, in a public statement the ACLU 
                                                 
196 Id. at 776. 
197 Id. at 779. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 780-82. 
200 Dan Eggen, Court Will Oversee Wiretap Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at A01. 
201 Id. 
202 See id.  Eggen noted: 
White House and Justice officials said the president was not retreating 
from his stance that he has the constitutional and legislative authority 
to order warrantless surveillance on international calls but [that] the 
new rules promulgated by the surveillance court have satisfied 
concerns about whether the FISA process can move quickly enough to 
authorize surveillance. 
Id.  Further, the Justice Department has continued to argue that federal judges are not 
qualified to decide terrorism issues.  Id. 
203 Dan Eggen, Dismissal of Lawsuit Against Warrantless Wiretaps Sought, WASH. POST, Jan. 
26, 2007, at A05. 
204 Id. 
Joyce and Bigart: Liability for All, Privacy for None:  The Conundrum of Protecting
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1512 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
stated that “‘[t]he FISA court didn’t reach out on its own to do 
something; the government asked it to do something, . . .  And absent a 
ruling, they are free to return to their illegal conduct again.’”205   
The NSA program launched a slew of lawsuits against the 
companies that cooperated with the government by providing access to 
customer information.  Although most of these cases remain in litigation, 
they nevertheless demonstrate that companies that cooperate with the 
government cannot necessarily rely on the statutory safe harbors for 
protection from angry customers.  For example, in Hepting and Terkel v. 
AT&T, two district courts reached two different conclusions about the 
legality of the NSA programs despite many common facts.   
In Hepting, plaintiffs filed suit against AT&T for essentially 
collaborating with the NSA wiretap program.206  AT&T immediately 
moved to dismiss the case alleging that the plaintiffs lacked standing.207  
In addition, the government moved to intervene as a defendant and 
moved to dismiss the claim based on the state secrets privilege.208  
However, according to the Hepting court, the government could not 
claim the state secrets privilege because it had disclosed significant 
information to the public about the program; as a result, the court 
rejected the government’s motion to dismiss.209  In support, the court 
noted that “the very subject matter of this action is hardly a 
secret . . . public disclosures by the government and AT&T indicate that 
AT&T is assisting the government to implement some kind of 
surveillance program.”210   
For its part, AT&T argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that 
AT&T was entitled to statutory, common law, and qualified immunity.211  
More specifically, ATT argued that under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B), 
“telecommunications providers are immune from suit if they receive a 
government certification authorizing them to conduct electronic 
surveillance.”212  The court found that it did not need to address AT&T’s 
claim because the plaintiffs pled that AT&T acted outside the scope of 
government certification.213  In essence, the Hepting court held that the 
                                                 
205 Id. 
206 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
207 Id. at 979. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 986-94 (dismissing the case based on the Toten/Tenent bar). 
210 Id. at 994. 
211 Id. at 999. 
212 Id. at 1001. 
213 Id. at 1002. 
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issue of whether the government authorized AT&T to disclose customer 
records was an issue that warranted further litigation.214   
To further confuse matters, in Terkel, another district court 
addressing similar claims against AT&T reached virtually opposite 
conclusions.  In Terkel, the district court addressed a challenge to AT&T’s 
disclosure of records of customer communications.215  Plaintiffs alleged 
that AT&T had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) by releasing records to the 
NSA.216  Although the court denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss, the court 
did grant the government’s motion to dismiss because “in contrast to the 
alleged content monitoring that is a key focus of the Hepting case, there 
have been no public disclosures of the existence or non-existence of 
AT&T’s claimed record turnover—the sole focus of the current 
complaint in the present case—that are sufficient to overcome the 
government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege.”217  The court 
concluded that § 2702(a)(3) provides private individuals with 
enforceable rights against carriers that disclose communication records 
to third parties; having found that plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury 
under the statute, the court denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss.218   
Nevertheless, the government convinced the court to dismiss the 
case based on the state secrets doctrine.219  After engaging in a lengthy 
review of the state secrets doctrine precedent, the court concluded that 
“based on the government’s public submission, the Court is persuaded 
that requiring AT&T to confirm or deny whether it has disclosed large 
quantities of telephone records to the federal government could give 
adversaries of this county valuable insight into the government’s 
intelligence activities.”220  Because the plaintiffs could not establish 
standing without such information from AT&T, the court granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss.221   
V.  LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY FORWARD 
Although the NSA surveillance litigation is ongoing, it is not too 
early to draw conclusions from the courts’ initial decisions.  Likewise, 
court decisions that have attempted to apply federal electronic privacy 
                                                 
214 Id. at 1003. 
215 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 900 (N. D. Ill 2006). 
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law to cellular phones, Internet-based services, and other new 
technologies provide perhaps unintended lessons.  The clear implication 
from all of these hotly contested cases is that an understanding of 
electronic privacy law has become critical whether you are a business, a 
government agent, or a private citizen, given the ubiquitous nature of 
the communications services we use every day.   
From the perspective of an employer, corporation or enterprise, even 
those that are not technically “communications service providers,” the 
early lessons from the NSA cases are fairly apparent, the main one being:  
ask for a court order before participating in any law enforcement 
surveillance activity.  It may be hard to say “no” to law enforcement 
officials, and, public safety is obviously a collective concern.  Still, if an 
electronic surveillance program is legitimate, it’s difficult to imagine 
why the government would be unable to get a court order to enforce it.  
Indeed, the Department of Justice’s recent capitulation to FISA oversight 
for the NSA surveillance programs begs the question as to why they 
didn’t get a court order in the first place.   
There may be various exemptions and protections for compliance 
with electronic surveillance programs, but, it is unwise for any business 
to invite a judicial proceeding to determine whether those exemptions 
apply to their particular actions.  All businesses, and in particular 
communications businesses, should have in place well-defined 
procedures and protocols for dealing with law enforcement surveillance 
requests.222   
With respect to electronic privacy issues in general, and the cases 
reviewed herein that have struggled to interpret relevant law, it is 
difficult to create simple or comprehensive plans and procedures to 
govern all forms of advanced communications technology.  
Fundamentally, all businesses and workplaces ought to have clearly 
defined internal rules and procedures for handling every form of 
electronic communications available throughout their enterprises.  These 
electronic communications policies need to be in writing, they need to be 
explained to all employees, employees need to read them, these policies 
need to be routinely honored and enforced, and they need to be revised 
whenever new laws, cases, technologies, or situations warrant their 
reconsideration.   
                                                 
222 For example, surveillance statutes now also apply to cable operators who have never 
previously faced requests for surveillance cooperation.  Gorelick et al, supra note 73, at 361.  
Cable operators must develop internal protocols and procedures to comply with such 
requests while still meeting their customer’s needs and privacy expectations. 
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From an individual’s perspective, citizens need to understand that 
almost any electronic communications device or service these days may 
be fair game for electronic surveillance, some lawful, some not.  Given 
the somewhat archaic nature of our electronic privacy laws, we are 
largely left to do what we can to safeguard the privacy of our own 
electronic information.  Questions remain as to whether the data we 
transmit over the Internet will be afforded a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” under electronic privacy laws should it fall into inappropriate 
hands.   
Finally, Congress must determine how far it wants to allow the law 
enforcement community to push the electronic surveillance envelope in 
the name of national security and public safety.  The time has come for 
Congress to address the increscent conflict between our outdated 
electronic privacy laws, modern communications technology, individual 
privacy rights, and legitimate law enforcement needs.  Without relevant 
changes in legislation to fit present day technology, courts will continue 
to render their own interpretations of federal laws, resulting in an 
uncertain and inconsistent legal landscape in which bad facts will 
increasingly dictate individual privacy rights.  This confusing and 
uncertain legal landscape makes compliance with the law difficult if not 
impossible.223  Absent legislative guidance, law enforcement officials 
may establish the standards for us, continuing to expand electronic 
surveillance activities to a degree not contemplated by the original laws 
or supported by the majority of the people. 
                                                 
223 See id. at 367 (“A provider’s subjective good-faith belief that its actions are lawful is 
not enough to immunize it from liability.”).  In addition, even when the surveillance 
statutes and company privacy policies clearly permit a communications provider to release 
information voluntarily, there may be some unwanted consequences of doing so.  Id.  “No 
provision in the statutes entitles companies to ‘uninvite’ the government after an 
investigation has begun.”  Id. at 372. 
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